Background and the First Maori War
Further from the home country than any other possession, the fledgling colony of New Zealand became the location for one of the first colonial wars under Queen Victoria's reign. Although initially reluctant to administer these remote islands, in 1840 the British Government offered a treaty to the native Maori in which sovereignty was exchanged for protection. The desire to create this treaty was stemmed as much from the fearsome reputation of the Maori as from the growing humanitarian trends in colonial policy. However, the cultural upheaval attendant with European settlement, coupled with misunderstanding of crucial issues on both issues, led to open conflict in the 1840s and again in the 1860s. The Maori proved to be one of the most courageous , resourceful and - above all - respected native foes encountered by Her Majesty's armed forces during the nineteenth century.
Discovery, settlement and fortification
Unlike many other regions the British came to colonise, New Zealand had been inhabited by humans for less than a thousand years before European settlement commenced at the very end of the eighteenth century. Astounding navigators and seamen, the Polynesians - most likely from the Marquesas or Society Islands - are believed to have arrived on the North Island in approximately 900 A.D. (1) Debate continues as to whether there were one or several waves of colonisation, but by 1400 A.D. these inhabitants had substantialy altered the ecology of their new environment and changed from a more opportunistic hunting lifestyle to one of cultivation and defensible settlements. (2).
Known as pa (variously referred to in the nineteenth century as "pahs" or "parrs"), the emergence of fortified strongholds signified a steady population growth that had led to increasing competition for resources and open warfare between Maori tribes (iwi) (3). While it appears the Maori people lived from day to day in villages of varying permanence, their pas can be broadly compared with a keep in a medieval European castle - a strategically sited and strongly fortified compound to which the tribe could retire in times of attack. As such, hilltops, ditches, walls, palisades and water were all utilised to varying degrees to protect the interior, which may have contained dwellings and stockpiled food. (4)
Maori warfare was rather ritualised and fought over issues such as land, resources, (including crops and stone), revenge (utu) and to increase personal or tribal status (mana). (5) Warriors favoured hand-to-hand combat using clubs (patu), stabbing spears (taiaha) and battleaxes (tewhatewha); projectile weapons such as throwing spears and bows and arrows appear to have been absent. (6) Although not unknown before European conflict, cannibalism as an aspect of Maori warfare appears to have grown substantially following the introduction of the musket. (7)
Contact, commerce and the Musket Wars
Known to the Maori as Aotearoa (land of the long white cloud), the name Zeelandia Nova was bestowed upon the islands by Abel Tasman following his arrival in 1642. However, real European interest in New Zealand only developed following James Cook's landing in October 1769 (only a few weeks before the Frenchman Jean-Francois-Marie de Surville). The establishment in 1788 of the Australian penal colony at Port Jackson (now Sydney) and a growth in Pacific trade meant that by the 1790s sealing and logging operations had brought semi-permanent European settlements to both the North and South Islands of New Zealand. (8) The first missionary arrived in 1814.
Although their warlike nature was noted from the very first contact with Europeans - indeed, several of Tasman's crew were killed by them - the Maori were also keen traders. As the population of Pakeha (foreigners, especially Europeans) slowly grew, commerce in flax, timber and, by the 1830s, land, meant that early contact was largely peaceful and mutually beneficial. (9) By far the most popular trading item from the natives' perspective was the musket, and it ushered in perhaps the most dramatic upheaval in Maori history: the Musket Wars.
Beginning in 1806, and rising to a peak in the 1820s and 1830s, the combination of traditional Maori warfare and increasing access to muskets created a bloody period of destructive raids and outright warfare that raged across both islands. (10) Tribes and alliances who obtained muskets decimated their neighbours - and others further afield - all in a series of campaigns that had, by the time they petered out in the early 1840s, led to the death, enslavement or forced migration of up to half of the 100-150,000 Maori who had been living in New Zealand at the turn of the century. (11) The subsequent translocation of the population, coupled with the introduction of European diseases such as influenza and tuberculosis, had a profound effect on Maori societies and their relationship to their tribal lands. (12)
As such, the years 1815-40 provide a fascinating contrast between the forces that were to oppose each other a few years later. While the British Army effectively stagnated after Waterloo and entered the 1840s with weapons, dress and tactics little changed since that victory (13) for the Maori this had been a period of violent transition. In addition to the social changes they wrought, the Musket Wars led the Maori to adapt their offensive and defensive tactics to suit the new weapon, including skirmishing techniques, volley fire and changes to the construction and defence of pas. (14).
The Treaty of Waitangi
From 1769 until the late 1830s, New Zealand had an uncertain standing in the international community. Not unified under any single regime, it was nevertheless a land of settled argiculturalists, which in international law at the time implied a level of ownership (unlike Australia, in which more nomadic Aboriginal people were considered to have no claim over the land). (15) While this independence was viewed rather negatively, in the sense that New Zealand was not under the influence of any European nation, the British government was extremely reluctant to intervene until the increasing numbers of its citizens settling there - and French and American expansionism - led to the installation oin 1833 of a Resident, James Busby. (16) One of his early acts was to present a gathering of Maori chiefs with a national flag to be flown by ships built in New Zealand. To the Maori, this ensign symbolised official recognition of both the independence of their nation and their diplomatic and commercial ties with Great Britain. (17)
During this early period, a number of requests and petitions had been made to the British Crown for protection, usually by single chiefs or small groups of tribes. (18) In 1835, Busby persuaded 34 important chiefs to sign a joint Declaration of Independence and appeal to King William IV for protection against attempts by other powers (i.e. France) to challenge this independence. (19) By the time of Queen Victoria's coronation in 1838 there was grudging acceptance in Britain that a more formal government structure would be necessary to manage the growing tide of colonists in this still independent territory. Taking cues from both North America and the less than admirable turn of events in Australia, in 1840 the new British consult in New Zealand, William Hobson, sought to sign a treaty with a confederation of chiefs to formalise this relationship. (20) First signed on 6 February 1840 by the chiefs gathered at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands, copies of this "Treaty of Waitangi" were subsequently taken to Maori tribes throughout the islands where the marks of many - but not all - chiefs were added to the list, eventually totalling over 530 signatures. (21)
In short, the Treaty of Waitangi comprised three articles: in the first, the Maori ceded sovereignty over their lands to the Queen; in the second, they granted the Crown exclusive rights to any land they wished to sell; and in the third, the Queen accorded the natives of New Zealand "Her royal protection and impart[ed] to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects". (22) Unfortunately, the Maori and British interpretations of the Treaty differed in crucial respects, due both to differing cultural perspectives and the actual translation of the document. In particular, the concepts of sovereignty and possession were not clearly communicated and led to misunderstandings that were not formally resolved until the 1990s. (23)
New Zealand 1846
In the years that followed Waitangi, relations between the colonists and the Maori were largely harmonious, but two issues became causes for increasing strain. The first was land. Some Maori became disquieted at the huge tracts of land being sold to the Pakeha, especially as in some cases the native ownership was still in dispute following the Musket Wars. It was not always appreciated that land sales were permanent and abrogated all of the seller's rights to use or access the land. (24) Moreover, there was tension over the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Waitangi, in that only the Crown was permitted to buy native land (which it then sold on for a tidy profit). (25) The second issue was the extent to which the Maori were governed by British law and authority - especially those whose chiefs had not signed the Treaty. Many chiefs were willing to abide by British judicial processes, but this did not necessarily supplant their own systems and thus became an alternative source of power that diminished their mana. (26)
The massacre at Wairau and the flagpole at Kororareka
Notwithstanding a number of isolated incidents, the first armed battle between Maori and colonists took place on 17 June 1843 at Wairau, on the northern tip of the South Island. Here, surveyors entering the land of the Ngati Toa tribe were politely driven off by warriors under the leadership of the feisty but ageing chief, Te Rauparaha. However, when the surveyors' hut was pulled down, a party of 49 armed men (not soldiers) under the command of Captain William Wakefield and the local magistrate travelled to Wairau to effect the arrest of Te Rauparaha. Despite conciliatory efforts on behalf of the Maori, the confrontation escalated and Wakefield ordered the men to fix bayonets and move forward. A shot was fired - it has never been established by whom - but the result was tragic.
Firing commenced on both sides, resulting in the deaths not only of Pakeha and Maori warriors, also but several women and children, including the wife of another chief, Te Rangihaeata. The Maori rapidly prevailed, routing the settlers and killing 22 of the party, including the magistrate and Wakefield, who were murdered after they surrendered as utu for the death of the chief's wife. (27) Although labelled a 'massacre' by the Pakeha, many of whom were for retaliation against the Ngati Toa, the lack of any real military forces in the colony and an official recognition of the overall justness of the Maori case meant that no further action was taken. (28) However, the incident had a polarising effect throughout the islands, and neither side was happy with the outcome or its implications.
This tension was to play a part in what led to the first confrontation between Maori and British soldiers, at Kororareka, very near Waitangi in the Bay of Islands. Formerly an active trading area, its fortunes had waned following the shift of the capital from Waitangi to Auckland, and the resultant depression was blamed by many Maori on the British administration. (29) Maori attitudes to the Crown were further dimmed by the arrest and hanging of a local chief, Maketu, for the murder of three whites and a Maori; although his crime was not disputed, this was considered a matter to be resolved by the injured tribe.
It so happened that another chief, Hone Heke, had made a gift of a flagstaff at Kororareka in order to fly the flag of the United Tribes that had been presented by Busby in 1834. The Maori had great respect for the status of such ensigns, and the replacement of their own flag by the Union Jack was a clear symbol of British sovereignty. (30) Heke thus cut down and burned the flagstaff on 8 July 1844. Although a large party of warriors came to apologise for the incident, the government confirmed the status of the flagstaff as a symbol of its authority by insisting it be re-erected, inflaming Heke to fell it several more times over the following year. When he did so again on 11 March 1845, in company with fellow chiefs Kawiti and Rewa, his attack sparked the first military battle between Maori and Pakeha.
The Flagstaff War
The British garrison in New Zealand at that time amounted to barely 100 men of the 96th Regiment, so reinforcements had been requested from New South Wales. (31) In the meantime, Governor FitzRoy despatched the 18-gun sloop Hazard to Kororareka, providing approximately 140 soldiers, sailors and marines under Captain Robertson, to which were added up to 200 armed citizens under the magistrate. (32) Such were the forces manning a number of defensive positions when Heke's force of 400 warriors - divided into three groups - attacked at 4 a.m. A single-gun battery was taken after a fierce fight with 45 men from the Hazard, and the blockhouse adjacent to the flagstaff was seized and the pole once more cut down. Further exchange of musketry continued from under cover until the next day, when the British forces departed and the Maoris sacked the town before withdrawing to establish a pa at nearby Puketutu.
The British were stunned and humiliated by the capture of the fifth-largest town in the colony, but could do little other than wait in Auckland until reinforcements arrived from Australia. (33) With the disembarkation of 215 men of the 58th (Rutlandshire) Regiment of Foot - previously employed in guarding convict ships - an expeditionary force was rapidly assembled under the experienced Lieutenant-Colonel William Hulme, comprising 300 redcoats, 120 sailors and marines, a small rocket group and 40 volunteer civilians. (34) Joint service operations were de rigeur for the First New Zealand or Flagstaff War, but from these very first campaigns, the battlefield and/or logistical support of Maori loyal to the government - known as kupapas - was also an important and sometimes critical factor.
Landing a little north of Kororareka, Hulme's men had a difficult and damp march to Puketutu pa, where Heke had some 200 warriors. Hulme was impressed by the construction of the pa, but despite firing rockets at it to no apparent effect, its strength was not truly tested by his men. On 8 May, just as a storming party comprising over half of the force was launched at Heke's pa, Kawiti and 140 of his warriors emerged from the bush and attacked the British rear. The party turned and were slowly but surely beating Kawiti's men in hand-to-hand combat when a group of warriors emerged from the pa and forced the now exhausted British to retreat. Both sides claimed Puketutu as a victory, and both lost similar numbers of casualties. While the Maori held their stronghold they had also recognised that in an essentially evenly-matched fight the discipline and courage of the British forces had compelled them to give ground, and they learned from this lesson: Puketutu was the last open battle of the New Zealand Wars. (35)
Slaughter outside the pa
Unfortunately the British had not learned to appreciate the strength of the pa. This was not aided by the arrival after Puketutu of a new commander, Colonel Henry Despard, a man with little respect for 'savages' - loyal or otherwise - and an inflexible approach to tactics. (36) However, for the next confrontation, the odds appeared to have moved toward the British: not only did they now have 615 men, but four cannon - and later a 32-pounder - were also brought to the battle. Heke's warriors, on the other hand, had been defeated in a major open battle with kupapa forces under Waka Nene at Te Ahuahu, and Heke himself wounded; good reasons for Despard to attack Kawiti's pa at Oheawai which contained only 100 men. (37).
However, Kawiti was an excellent military engineer, and owing to its stout construction, six days of fairly constant cannonade produced no apparent effect on the pa; the 32-pounder appeared to be similarly ineffective. (38) To add to Despard's vexation, some of Kawiti's men sallied out to attack the batteries and captured a British flag, which they then flew upside down beneath their own inside the pa. On 1 July 1845, the British commander ordered a frontal assault for the early hours of the following morning, despite the reservations of several of his officers and Maori allies. Kawiti had designed the pa to provide several obstacles to attack, including anti-artillery bunkers and several rows of palisades, plus he sited many loopholes and trenches to give his warriors safe firing positions from which to keep up a withering crossfire. (39) The Maoris had also learned the value of volley fire, adding to the fearsome defences faced by the British storming party, as described by Corporal William Free of the 58th Regiment:
" The whole front of the pa flashed fire and in a moment we were in a one-sided fight - gun flashes from the foot of the stockade and from loopholes higher up, smoke half hiding the pa from us, yells and cheers and men falling all round. A man was shot in front of me and another was hit behind me. Not a single Maori could we see. They were all safely hidden in their trenches and pits, poking the muzzles of their guns under the foot of the outer palisade. What could we do? We tore at the fence, firing through it, thrusting our bayonets in, or trying to pull a part of it down, but it was a hopeless business." (44)
The party retreated, almost half of the 250 men who attacked the pa having been killed or wounded by the Maori defenders. (41) The next week Kawiti's men abandoned the pa - which in itself had no economic or strategic value - and Despard's forces strolled in to claim a victory. Although the British commander cannot be held entirely accountable for failing to appreciate the ingenuity of Kawiti and the murderous effectiveness of this improved style of pa, when the Duke of Wellington later read the despatches he commented that only distance had spared Despard from a court martial. (42)
This did not stop him from intending to repeat essentially the same mistakes six months later. For despite negotiations between Governor FitzRoy and the recuperating Heke and Kawiti, no peace terms were agreed by the time FitzRoy was dismissed and a new governor - Captain George Grey - took office. (43) Toward the end of 1845 Grey and Despard gathered an impressive force of some 800 redcoats, 400 naval brigade troops, and 80 men from the East India Company's forces. The numbers of kupapa are unclear but probably numbered between 400 and 800 warriors. (44) With five warships plus transports, the new expedition also boasted a considerable artillery presence comprising three 32-pounders and ten smaller pieces of varying calibre, including mortars. This expeditionary force arrived just before Christmas outside Kawiti's pa at Ruapekapeka, which contained approximately 400 warriors.
After two weeks of fairly constant bombardment the Maoris inside had suffered few casualties but their outer palisades were damaged: on 10 January three breaches had been made. On this date, Hone Heke and 60 warriors also arrived to reinforce the defenders. Despard planned another frontal assault for this day but much to the relief of his men he was convinced to hold off. (45) Astoundingly, the following morning his men found the pa to be apparently abandoned and rushed in, chasing the few remaining occupants into the bush. Although it has been claimed through the years that, being a Sunday, most of the Maori had retired to the nearby bush for church services, this is disputed; an alternative view is that the Maori had essentially evacuated the pa and were hoping to draw the British forces into an ambush in the surrounding forest. (46) The British, however, stayed put and Despard claimed that the pa had been won by an assault. When Heke and Kawiti came to discuss terms with the kupapa Waka Nene a week later, Governor Grey agreed to the peace and claimed Ruapekapeka as a resounding British victory. (47) It is perhaps more correct to consider Ruapekapeka a tactical draw in which the strategic outcome was unclear: the expedition against Kawiti's pa had consumed enormous British resources to reach and invest, yet the Maori knew full well that their fortifications were essentially valueless. Waka Nene re-erected the flagstaff at Kororareka on 7 February 1846, but it was dismantled by official order only a few days later. (48)
The conclusion of the First War
Thus did the First New Zealand War come to a close: with no clear victory, and a standing-down of forces on both sides. However, several important lessons were learned from this war. The first was that the Maori were indeed not a united nation, with only a minority of northern tribes joining Heke and Kawiti, and almost as many kupapa choosing to side with the British. The motives of the kupapa may have been more aligned with traditional enmities than with an especial loyalty to the Crown, but as the British had found in India and elsewhere, local forces were a valuable and often vital factor in defeating other 'rebellious' tribes. In fact, had it not been for the support of the kupapa on and off the battlefield, the outcome of this first war may have been quite different. (49)
However, both Maori and Pakeha forces had learned a great deal about each other during this relatively short campaign. For their part, the Maori learned to avoid open warfare and instead to build disposable but immensely strong fortifications in order to draw the British into attacking at a tactical disadvantage. Their courage and fierceness was also respected by at least some of the troops who encountered them, although it is fair to say that many still considered the Maori savages. (50) This impression was perhaps reinforced by the fact that the Maori well appreciated the demoralising value of horror in warfare, which added to their often ritual practice of disfiguring defeated enemies. At Oheawai the screams of tortured prisoners could be heard by the soldiers besieging the pa, and the advancing troops came across the bodies of their comrades mutilated either before or after death. Major Cyprian Bridge, of the 58th Regiment, noted after the failed attack on the pa that "it was most disgusting to see the manner in which some of the bodies were mutilated and the want of respect shewn to them". (51)
Although accoutred in the scarlet tunics of Waterloo and burdened down by up to 70 pounds (32 kg) of equipment, the valour, endurance, discipline and ferocity of the British soldier were noted by the Maori. In addition, the soldiers had shown initiative and adapted in the field to make use of extended order and to utilise cover when attacking, rather than slavishly following the close order and straight lines of their drill. (52) However, writing in the 1860s the former Colonial Secretary and Native Minister, William Fox, was quite scathing in his assessment of these early campaigns:
"They entirely destroyed the prestige which the Queen's troops had previously enjoyed in the eyes of the natives. Our operations were conducted with so little military skill; our disasters so serious and so many; the losses of the natives were so small, and they outwitted and out-generalled us on so many occasions, that though ... fighting ceased, yet a feeling of supreme contempt for the soldiers became permanently and generally impressed on the native mind. The only superiority on our part which they would admit after these wars, was the possession of greater resources in the shape of arms and ammunition, a conclusion which stimulated them to the acquisition at any cost of means which alone they believed to be wanting to give them an absolute superiority in case of future hostilities." (53)
Although the ability of the commanding officers was certainly questionable at times, this assessment seems rather harsh given the performance of the troops in the field, fighting under conditions for which they were ill-equipped and largely untrained. As to the question of their firearms, although the 58th had begun equipping with the new 1839 pattern percussion musket before being called to New Zealand, Maori warriors also went to great lengths to obtain recent-style muskets and shotguns; in fact, the latter offered an advantage in the close-contact fighting of these early campaigns as the scatter of shot made aiming less important and two barrels could be discharged before reloading was necessary. (54) The artillery used in the campaign had little value in light of the Maoris' rapid adoption of bunkers as part of the design of their pas, and in fact transporting heavy cannon overland imposed significant logistical problems for the British.
The peace after Ruapekapeka, although initially shaky, held for 15 years, and by the 1860s the colony of New Zealand was a very different place. However, neither side had necessarily learned all of the lessons of the First New Zealand War, and for a collection of reasons old and new, battle commenced once more between Maori and Pakeha.
1. Michael Trotter and Beverley McCulloch. Unearthing New Zealand.
Wellington: Government Printing Office, 1989, p.28.
2. Trotter, p.53 and Malcolm McKinnon (ed.). New Zealand Historical Atlas. Auckland: David Bateman, 1997, Plate 12.
3. Trotter, pp.72-5 and McKinnon, Plate 11.
4. Trotter, pp.74-7.
5. Peter Adams. Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1977, p.37.
6. Trotter, p.78 and M.H. Holcroft. The Shaping of New Zealand. Auckland: Paul Hamlyn, 1974, p.22.
7. Trotter, pp.80-1. However, the increasing adoption of Christianity tempered this trend after 1850 (with certain notable and often deliberate exceptions).
8. Trotter, pp.96-8 and McKinnon, Plate 27. These included British, American and - to a lesser extent - French interests.
9. Trotter, pp.102-3, McKinnon, Plate 28 and Holcroft, pp.74-5.
10. Ron D. Crosby. The Musket Wars: a History of Inter-iwi Conflict, 1806-1845. Auckland: Reed Books, 1999, p.17 and Tony Simpson. Te Riri Pakeha: The White Man's Anger. Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979, pp.27-8.
11. Crosby, p.17. Estimates of the Maori population vary widely, but it is clear that by the 1860s their numbers had dwindled considerably from the pre-contact levels.
12. McKinnon, Plate 29 and Simpson, pp.27-8.
13. H.C.B. Rogers. Weapons of the British Soldier. London: Sphere Books, 1972, p.170 and Michael Barthorp. To Face the Daring Maoris: Soldiers' Impressions of the First Maori War, 1845-7. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979, p.12.
14. Trotter, p.77 and James Belich. The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict. Auckland: Penguin Books, 1998, pp.49-50.
15. Adams, p.51 and C.D. Rowley. The Destruction of Aboriginal Society. Melbourne: Penguin 1972, pp.15-16. The two regions provide a fascinating contrast; Rowley sums up colonial attitudes unequivocally: "The Maori was respected as a warrior; the Aboriginal was despised as a rural pest". Yet for several years in the late 1820s, the threat of Aboriginal war parties kept the colony of Tasmania in constant alarm, with settler fears in Hobart running just as high as they did in Auckland in 1845.
16. Adams, pp.51-2 and Claudia Orange. The Treaty of Waitangi. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1987, p.9.
17. Ibid, pp.20-1.
18. Ibid, pp.11-12. This was often at the urging of missionaries and should not be considered a concerted or national request by the Maori for international intervention.
19. Ibid, pp.21-2 and pp.255-6. Several incidents had given the French a poor reputation amongst the Maori, and the British colonists played upon fears of increased French activity in order to promote native appeals to the British Crown.
20. Orange, p.27, Rowland, p.15 and Henry Reynolds. Fate of a Free People. Melbourne: Penguin, 1995, p.122. An agreement of sorts had been made between the British colonists and the Tasmanian Aborigines, but this was a less formal document than the Treaty of Waitangi and has been largely forgotten in Australian history.
21. Orange, pp.51-5 and p.260. Orange's text is considered the pre-eminent source on the Treaty of Waitangi and its interpretation and abuse since 1840.
22. Ibid, pp.36-7 and pp.257-9.
23. Ibid, pp.40-3.
24. Ibid, p.115. Similarly, some colonists found that while they had bought the real estate, the former Maori owners forbade them from removing material - such as valued stone - from the property, as this was not considered part of the purchase.
25. Ibid, pp.100-6. Clearly, many colonists also resented this monopoly and the subsequently inflated prices, but the government's prime motivation appears to have been to ensure fair dealings with the Maori and to provide funds to support the growing colonial infrastructure.
26. Ibid, pp.106-13.
27. Simpson, pp.81-2.
28. Simpson, p.82, Belich, p.21 and Orange, p.117. The official verdict was accepted by few settlers.
29. Simpson, p.85 and Orange, p.118.
30. Simpson, p.86 and Orange, p.118. The flag flew over what was still Maori land.
31. Barthorp, p.12.
32. Simpson, p.87 and Belich, pp.36-7.
33. Belich, pp.37-41.
34. Belich, p.41 and Barthorp, pp.12-13.
35. Belich, pp.41-4. This was not a question of courage; in fact, it appears that inter-Maori warfare continued along more traditional lines for some time. However, in the face of limited numbers against the clearly superior resources of the British, the Maori recognised a change in tactics was essential.
36. Simpson, p.92.
37. Belich, pp.45-6.
38. Simpson, p.92 and Belich, p.47.
39. Belich, pp.49-52.
40. Barthorp, pp.102-3.
41. Belich, p.47.
42. Simpson, p.94.
43. Belich, pp.54-8.
44. Ibid, pp.58-9.
45. Simpson, p.94.
46. Simpson, p.94, Belich, pp.59-63 and John Caselberg (ed.). Maori is My Name: Historical Writings in Translation. Dunedin: J. McIndoe, 1975, pp.68-9.
47. Belich, p.61.
48. McKinnon, Plate 31.
49. Barthorp, p.188. Maori forces on both sides were often not on campaign for extended periods of time, as they had crops and families to tend to, often returning to these soon after engagements had ended.
50. Ibid, p.188. The Maori perhaps best embodied the Victorian idea of the 'noble savage' who could be bettered through Christianity.
51. Ibid, p.106. These included flaying, gouging out of eyes and tongue, cutting off limbs and removal of the genitals, plus - on occasion - cannibalistic acts. Of course, there were contemporary parallels in European warfare, with Napoleon's Peninsular and Russian campaigns leading to comparable acts of barbarity on both sides.
52. Ibid, p.91.
53. William Fox. The War in New Zealand (facsimile edition). Christchurch: Capper Press, 1973, pp.21-2.
54. Barthorp, p.35.